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FAMILY OF CHAOTIC MAPS FROM GAME THEORY
THIPARAT CHOTIBUT, FRYDERYK FALNIOWSKI, MICHA L MISIUREWICZ,
AND GEORGIOS PILIOURAS
Abstract. From a two-agent, two-strategy congestion game where both agents
apply the multiplicative weights update algorithm, we obtain a two-parameter fam-
ily of maps of the unit square to itself. Interesting dynamics arise on the invariant
diagonal, on which a two-parameter family of bimodal interval maps exhibits peri-
odic orbits and chaos. While the fixed point b corresponding to a Nash equilibrium
of such map f is usually repelling, it is globally Cesa`ro attracting on the diagonal,
that is,
lim
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
k=0
fk(x) = b
for every x in the minimal invariant interval. This solves a known open question
whether there exists a nontrivial smooth map other than x 7→ axe−x with centers of
mass of all periodic orbits coinciding. We also study the dependence of the dynamics
on the two parameters.
1. Introduction
We will consider a 2× 2 (two agents/players, two pure strategies) congestion game
(see [7, 5]) and examine its dynamics under a specific model of learning behavior for
both agents known as multiplicative weights update [1].
We will start off with the description of the two agent game. Let x be the probability
that the first player (agent) chooses the first strategy (he chooses the second strategy
with probability 1 − x). Similarly, let y be the probability that the second player
(agent) chooses the first strategy (he chooses the second strategy with probability
1 − y). We denote a tuple of such randomized strategies as (x, y). If the agents
choose the same strategy, this leads to congestion, and the cost increases. We will
assume that the cost of a strategy is proportional to its load, i.e., to the number of
agents choosing this strategy. If we denote by c(i, j) the expected cost of the player
number i playing the strategy number j, and the coefficients of proportionality are
α, β, then we get
(1)
c(1, 1) = α(1 + y), c(2, 1) = α(1 + x),
c(1, 2) = β(1 + (1− y)) = β(2− y), c(2, 2) = β(1 + (1− x)) = β(2− x).
A strategy profile/tuple (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if no agent can
strictly decrease their expected cost by unilaterally deviating to another strategy.
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1.1. Multiplicative Weights Update. We will assume that both agents participate
in the game by applying the multiplicative weights update (MWU) algorithm [1]. At
time n, the first (second) player/agent chooses the first strategy with probability xn
(yn). We will study MWU in the full informational setting, where each agent gets to
experience the cost of all strategies available to them. Moreover, the (expected) cost
of strategy j for agent 1 (respectively, 2) at time n is computed given the randomized
choice of agent 2 (respectively, 1). In this case, the update of the mixed/randomized
strategies of each agent when applying MWU with learning rate ε ∈ (0, 1) is as follows:
(2)
xn+1 =
xn(1− ε)
c(1,1)
xn(1− ε)c(1,1) + (1− xn)(1− ε)c(1,2)
,
yn+1 =
yn(1− ε)
c(2,1)
yn(1− ε)c(2,1) + (1− yn)(1− ε)c(2,2)
.
Observe that in this way large cost at time n leads to the decrease of the probability
of doing the same at time n + 1. The learning rate ε can be thought of as capturing
the patience of the agents. For small ε the agents adapt slowly to the costs whereas
for large ε they respond more aggressively. We will study the effects of this learning
rate ε to the stability of the MWU dynamics. In [6] it was shown that there exist
2 × 2 congestion games where MWU with large enough ε can lead to limit cycles or
chaos. We will establish the emergence of chaos for all 2 × 2 congestion games for
large enough learning rate ε.
2. Dynamical model
Let us plug into (2) the values of the cost functions from (1):
(3)
xn+1 =
xn(1− ε)
α(1+yn)
xn(1− ε)α(1+yn) + (1− xn)(1− ε)β(2−yn)
=
xn
xn + (1− xn)(1− ε)β(2−yn)−α(1+yn)
,
yn+1 =
yn(1− ε)
α(1+xn)
yn(1− ε)α(1+xn) + (1− yn)(1− ε)β(2−xn)
=
yn
yn + (1− yn)(1− ε)β(2−xn)−α(1+xn)
.
We introduce new variables
(4) a = (α + β) ln
1
1− ε
, b =
2β − α
α + β
.
Then formulas (3) become
(5)
xn+1 =
xn
xn + (1− xn) exp(a(yn − b))
,
yn+1 =
yn
yn + (1− yn) exp(a(xn − b))
.
FAMILY OF CHAOTIC MAPS FROM GAME THEORY 3
Clearly, if (xn, yn) ∈ [0, 1]
2 then also (xn+1, yn+1) ∈ [0, 1]
2. Therefore we will be
studying the family of maps Fa,b : [0, 1]
2 → [0, 1]2, given by
(6) Fa,b(x, y) =
(
x
x+ (1− x) exp(a(y − b))
,
y
y + (1− y) exp(a(x− b))
)
.
The diagonal x = y is invariant for Fa,b, so we can restrict this map to the diagonal
and we get the family of maps fa,b : [0, 1]→ [0, 1], given by
(7) fa,b(x) =
x
x+ (1− x) exp(a(x− b))
.
In the context of game theory, this restriction means that both players start with the
same mixed strategy (the same probability distributions).
Our aim is to investigate the long-term behavior of the orbits of Fa,b and fa,b. In
particular, we can consider periodic orbits, their stability, or chaos. When speaking of
chaos, we will use its most popular kind, Li-Yorke chaos. Namely, if X is a compact
space with metric ρ and f : X → X is a continuous map, we say that the pair of
points x, y ∈ X is a Li-Yorke pair if
lim inf
n→∞
ρ(fn(x), fn(y)) = 0,
lim sup
n→∞
ρ(fn(x), fn(y)) > 0.
The map f is Li-Yorke chaotic if there is an uncountable set S ⊂ X (called scrambled
set) such that every pair (x, y) with x, y ∈ S and x 6= y is a Li-Yorke pair.
Before starting detailed investigation of the families of maps Fa,b and fa,b, let us
determine what we should assume about a and b. By (4), a > 0 and as we mentioned,
we will be interested most at large values of a. While (4) does not provide any
restrictions for b, let us think what happens if b < 0.
Then Fa,b has four fixed points: (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1). Moreover, xn+1 < xn
unless xn = 0 or xn = 1. Similarly, yn+1 < yn unless yn = 0 or yn = 1. Therefore,
trajectories of all points of (0, 1)2 converge to (0, 0). Similarly, if b > 1 then trajec-
tories of all points of (0, 1)2 converge to (1, 1). This dynamics is not interesting. If
b = 0 or b = 1, there are additionally segments of fixed points on the boundary of the
square, but still the dynamics is not worth studying. Therefore, we will assume that
b ∈ (0, 1).
3. On the diagonal
Let us start investigating the dynamics of the maps fa,b, given by (7), with a > 0,
b ∈ (0, 1) (see Figure 1). This map has three fixed points: 0, b and 1.
The derivative of fa,b is given by
(8) f ′a,b(x) =
(ax2 − ax+ 1) exp(a(x− b))(
x+ (1− x) exp(a(x− b))
)2 .
Thus,
f ′a,b(0) = exp(ab), f
′
a,b(1) = exp(a(1− b)), f
′
a,b(b) = ab
2 − ab+ 1.
We see that the fixed points 0 and 1 are always repelling, while b is repelling if
a > 2
b(1−b)
.
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Figure 1. The map fa,b with a = 14, b = 0.4.
The critical points of fa,b are solutions to ax
2 − ax + 1 = 0. Thus, if 0 < a ≤ 4,
then fa,b is strictly increasing. If a > 4, it has two critical points
(9) cl =
1
2
−
√
1
4
−
1
a
, cr =
1
2
+
√
1
4
−
1
a
,
so the map fa,b is bimodal.
Our family has some symmetry. Consider the flip ϕ : [0, 1]→ [0, 1], ϕ(x) = 1 − x.
Then
ϕ(fa,b(x)) = 1−
x
x+ (1− x) exp(a(x− b))
=
(1− x) exp(a(x− b))
x+ (1− x) exp(a(x− b))
=
(1− x)
(1− x) + x exp(a((1− x)− (1− b)))
= fa,1−b(ϕ(x)).
This can be written as
(10) ϕ ◦ fa,b = fa,1−b ◦ ϕ, where ϕ(x) = 1− x.
While [0, 1] is the natural space on which fa,b acts, it will be sometimes easier to
think of a smaller interval.
Lemma 3.1. For every a > 0, b ∈ (0, 1) there exists a closed interval Ia,b ⊂ (0, 1)
such that fa,b(Ia,b) ⊂ Ia,b and fa,b-trajectories of all points of (0, 1) enter Ia,b.
Proof. Since 0 and 1 are repelling fixed points of fa,b, there exist δ1 > 0 and λ > 1 such
that if x < δ1 or 1−x < δ1 then λx < fa,b(x) < 1−λx. We have fa([δ1, 1−δ1]) ⊂ (0, 1),
so there exists δ2 > 0 such that fa([δ1, 1− δ1]) ⊂ (δ2, 1− δ2). Set δ = min(δ1, δ2) and
Ia,b = [δ, 1− δ]. Then Ia,b is mapped by fa,b to itself, and all fa,b-trajectories of points
from (0, 1) sooner or later enter Ia,b. 
Let us investigate regularity of fa,b. It is clear that it is analytic. However, nice
properties of interval maps are guaranteed not by analyticity, but by the negative
Schwarzian derivative. Let us recall that the Schwarzian derivative of f is given by
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the formula
Sf =
f ′′′
f ′
−
3
2
(
f ′′
f ′
)2
.
A “metatheorem” states that almost all natural noninvertible interval map have neg-
ative Schwarzian derivative. Note that if a ≤ 4 then fa,b is a homeomorphism, so
we should not expect negative Schwarzian derivative for that case (and it would be
useless, anyway).
Proposition 3.2. If a > 4 then the map fa,b has negative Schwarzian derivative.
Proof. Instead of making very complicated computations, we will use the formula
S(h ◦ f) = (f ′)2((Sh) ◦ f) + Sf and the fact that Mo¨bius transformations have zero
Schwarzian derivative. Set h(x) = exp(ab)1−x
x
and g(x) = h ◦ fa,b(x) =
1−x
x
exp(ax);
then Sg = Sf .
Now, simple computations yield
Sg(x) = −
a
(
− 12 + 6a+ 4a2(−1 + x)x+ a3(−1 + x)2x2
)
2
(
1 + a(−1 + x)x
)2 .
Thus, the Schwarzian derivative of fa,b is negative if and only if
−12 + 6a+ 4a2x(x− 1) + a3x2(1− x)2 > 0.
Set t = x(1− x). Then the above inequality becomes
(11) Pa(t) > 0, where Pa(t) = a
3t2 − 4a2t + 6a− 12.
Clearly, t ∈ [0, 1/4].
The quadratic polynomial Pa attains its minimum at t = 2/a. If 2/a ≤ 1/4, that
is, if a ≥ 8, we have Pa(2/a) = 2a − 12 > 0, so (11) holds. If a ∈ (0, 8), then (11)
holds whenever Pa(1/4) > 0. We have Pa(1/4) = (a− 4)(
1
16
a2 − 3
4
a+ 3). The second
factor is always positive, and thus Pa(1/4) > 0 for a > 4. 
For maps with negative Schwarzian derivative each attracting or neutral periodic
orbit has a critical point in its immediate basin of attraction. Thus, we know that if
a > 4 then fa,b can have at most two attracting or neutral periodic orbits.
3.1. Average behavior. While we know that the fixed point b is often repelling,
especially for large values of a, we can show that it is attracting in a certain sense.
Definition 3.3. For an interval map f a point p is Cesa`ro attracting if it has a
neighborhood U such that for every x ∈ U the averages
1
n
n−1∑
k=0
fk(x)
converge to p.
We will show that b is globally Cesa`ro attracting. Here by “globally” we mean that
the set U from the definition is the interval (0, 1).
Theorem 3.4. For every a > 0, b ∈ (0, 1) and x ∈ (0, 1) we have
(12) lim
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
k=0
fka,b(x) = b.
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Proof. By Lemma 3.1 there is a closed interval Ia,b ⊂ (0, 1) which is invariant for fa,b.
Thus, there is δ ∈ (0, 1) such that Ia,b ⊂ (δ, 1− δ).
Fix x = x0 ∈ [0, 1] and use our notation xn = f
n
a,b(x0). By induction, we get
(13) xn =
x
x+ (1− x) exp
(
a
∑n−1
k=0(xk − b)
) .
Assume that x = x0 ∈ Ia,b. Since δ < xn < 1− δ, we have
x
1− δ
< x+ (1− x) exp
(
a
n−1∑
k=0
(xk − b)
)
<
x
δ
,
so
δ2 < x
δ
1 − δ
< (1− x) exp
(
a
n−1∑
k=0
(xk − b)
)
< x
1 − δ
δ
<
1
δ
.
Therefore
(14) δ2 < exp
(
a
n−1∑
k=0
(xk − b)
)
<
1
δ2
,
so ∣∣∣∣∣a
n−1∑
k=0
(xk − b)
∣∣∣∣∣ < 2 log(1/δ).
This inequality can be rewritten as∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n−1∑
k=0
xk − b
∣∣∣∣∣ < 2 log(1/δ)an ,
and (12) follows.
If x ∈ (0, 1)r Ia,b, then by the definition of Ia,b (Lemma 3.1) there is n0 such that
fn0a,b(x) ∈ Ia,b, so (12) also holds. 
Corollary 3.5. For every periodic orbit {x0, x1, . . . , xn−1} of fa,b in (0, 1) its center
of mass
x0 + x1 + · · ·+ xn−1
n
is equal to b.
Applying the Birkhoff Ergodic Theorem, we get a stronger corollary.
Corollary 3.6. For every probability measure µ, invariant for fa,b and such that
µ({0, 1}) = 0, we have ∫
[0,1]
x dµ = b.
Corollary 3.5 solves a known question whether there are nontrivial smooth maps
other than x 7→ axe−x with centers of mass of all periodic orbits coinciding [4]. Here
“nontrivial” means that there are periodic orbits of infinitely many periods; we will
show later that for many parameters fa,b has this property.
Problem 3.7. Find all nontrivial smooth (analytic) maps for which centers of mass
of all periodic orbits coincide.
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3.2. Symmetric case. Now we explore what happens as we fix b and let a go to
infinity. First we study the symmetric case, b = 1/2, which corresponds to equal
coefficients of the cost functions, α = β. To simplify notation we denote fa = fa,1/2,
so
fa(x) =
x
x+ (1− x) exp(a(x− 1/2))
.
The interpretation of the formula (10) is very simple in this case: the maps fa and
ϕ commute. Set ga = ϕ ◦ fa = fa ◦ ϕ. Since ϕ is an involution, we have g
2
a = f
2
a .
We show that the dynamics of fa is simple, no matter how large a is.
Theorem 3.8. The ga-trajectory of every point of (0, 1) converges to a fixed point of
ga. The fa-trajectory of every point of (0, 1) converges to a fixed point or a periodic
orbit of period 2 of fa, other than 0 and 1.
Proof. We want to find fixed points and points of period 2 of fa and ga. Clearly,
fa(0) = 0, fa(1) = 1, ga(0) = 1, ga(1) = 0.
By (13) we have
f 2a (x) =
x
x+ (1− x) exp(a(x+ fa(x)− 1))
,
so the fixed points of f 2a are 0, 1 and the solutions to x + fa(x) − 1 = 0, that is, to
ga(x) = x. Thus, the fixed points of g
2
a (which, as we noticed, is equal to f
2
a ) are the
fixed points of ga and 0 and 1.
We can choose the invariant interval Ia = Ia,1/2 symmetric, so that ϕ(Ia) = Ia.
Let us look at Ga = ga|Ia : Ia → Ia. All fixed points of G
2
a are also fixed points of
Ga, so Ga has no periodic points of period 2. By the Sharkovsky Theorem, Ga has
no periodic points other than fixed points. For such maps it is known (see, e.g., [9])
that the ω-limit set of every trajectory is a singleton of a fixed point, that is, every
trajectory converges to a fixed point. If x ∈ (0, 1) r Ia, then the ga-trajectory of x
after a finite time enters Ia, so ga-trajectories of all points of (0, 1) converge to a fixed
point of ga in Ia. Observe that a fixed point of ga can be a fixed point of fa (other
that 0, 1) or a periodic point of fa of period 2. Thus the fa-trajectory of every point
of (0, 1) converges to a fixed point or a periodic orbit of period 2 of fa, other than 0
and 1. 
Let us identify the possible limits from the above theorem.
Theorem 3.9. If 0 < a ≤ 8 then fa-trajectories of all points of (0, 1) converge to the
fixed point 1/2. If a > 8 then fa has a periodic attracting orbit {σa, 1 − σa}, where
0 < σa < 1/2. This orbit attracts trajectories of all points of (0, 1), except countably
many points, whose trajectories eventually fall into the repelling fixed point 1/2.
Proof. Observe first that 1/2 is a fixed point of both fa and ga. Then, let us look for
the fixed points of ga in [0, 1/2]. They are the solutions of the equation ga(x) = x,
that is, fa(x) = 1− x, which is equivalent to
x2 = (1− x)2 exp(a(x− 1/2)).
Since x, 1 − x and exp(a(x − 1/2)) are non-negative, this equation is equivalent to
γa(x) = 0, where
γa(x) = x− (1− x) exp((a/2)(x− 1/2)).
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We have
γ′a(x) = 1 +
(
1− (a/2) + (a/2)x
)
exp
(
(a/2)(x− 1/2)
)
,
γ′′a(x) = (a/2)
(
2− (a/2) + (a/2)x
)
exp
(
(a/2)(x− 1/2)
)
.
For all a > 0 we have γa(0) < 0 and γa(1/2) = 0. If a ≥ 8 then γ
′′
a ≤ 0 on
[0, 1/2], so γa is concave there. We have γ
′
8(1/2) = 0, so since γa is real analytic,
we have γ8(x) < 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1/2). For all a ∈ (0, 8] and x ∈ [0, 1/2) we have
γa(x) ≤ γ8(x) < 0, so in this case ga has no fixed points in [0, 1/2). However, if a > 8
then γ′a(1/2) = 2− a/4 < 0, so γa has exactly one zero in [0, 1/2). Thus, in this case
ga has exactly one fixed point in [0, 1/2). We denote it by σa.
The situation for x ∈ (1/2, 1] is the same, because ϕ conjugates ga with itself and
maps [0, 1/2) to (1/2, 1]. Observe that fa(σa) = 1 − ga(σa) = 1 − σa and similarly,
fa(1− σa) = σa.
Now, if 0 < a ≤ 8, then 1/2 is the only fixed point of ga in (0, 1), so by Theorem 3.8,
the ga-trajectory of every point of (0, 1) converges to 1/2. Thus, the fa-trajectory of
every point of (0, 1) also converges to 1/2.
If a > 8, then |g′a(1/2)| = |f
′
a(1/2)| > 1 by (8), so the only way a ga-trajectory of
x can converge to 1/2 is that gna (x) = 1/2 for some n. Since the function ga is real
analytic, there are only countably many such points x. According to Theorem 3.8,
the ga-trajectories of all other points of (0, 1) converge to σa or 1 − σa. Thus, the
period 2 orbit {σa, 1− σa} of fa attracts fa-trajectories of all points of (0, 1), except
countably many points, whose trajectories eventually fall to the repelling fixed point
1/2. 
3.3. Asymmetric case. Now we proceed with the case when b 6= 1/2, that is, the
cost functions differ. As we noticed in Section 3, if a ≤ 4 then fa,b is strictly increasing
and has three fixed points: 0 and 1 repelling and b attracting. Therefore in this case
trajectories of all points of (0, 1) converge in a monotone way to b.
We know that the fixed point b is repelling if and only if a > 2
b(1−b)
.
Conjecture 3.10. If a ≤ 2
b(1−b)
then trajectories of all points of (0, 1) converge to b.
This is a simple situation, so we turn to the case of large a. We fix b ∈ (0, 1)r{1/2}
and let a go to infinity. We will show that if a becomes sufficiently large (but how
large, depends on b), then fa,b is Li-Yorke chaotic and has periodic orbits of all periods.
Theorem 3.11. If b ∈ (0, 1) r {1/2}, then there exists ab such that if a > ab then
fa,b has periodic orbit of period 3.
Proof. Fix a > 0 and b, x ∈ (0, 1) (we will vary a later). As in the proof of Theo-
rem 3.4, we set xn = f
n
a,b(x), and then the formula (13) holds. Hence, fa,b(x) > x is
equivalent to x < b and f 3a,b(x) < x is equivalent to x+ fa,b(x) + f
2
a,b(x) > 3b.
Assume that 0 < b < 1/2. Then 3b − 1 < b, so we can take x > 0 such that
3b − 1 < x < b. Then fa,b(x) > x. Moreover, exp(a(x − b)) goes to 0 as a goes to
infinity, so
lim
a→∞
fa,b(x) = lim
a→∞
x
x+ (1− x) exp(a(x− b))
= 1.
Thus, since 3b − x < 1, there exists ab such that if a > ab then fa,b(x) > 3b − x, so
x+ fa,b(x) + f
2
a,b(x) > 3b (note that x depends only on b, not on a). Hence, if a > ab
then f 3a,b(x) < x.
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Now, because for a > ab there exist x such that f
3
a,b(x) < x < fa,b(x), from the
theorem from [2] it follows that if a > ab then fa,b has a periodic point of period 3.
If 1/2 < b < 1 then by (10) we can reduce it to the case 0 < b < 1/2. 
By the Sharkovsky Theorem ([8], see also [3]), existence of a periodic orbit of period
3 implies existence of periodic orbits of all periods, and by the result of [3], it implies
that the map is Li-Yorke chaotic.
Thus, we get the following corollary.
Corollary 3.12. If b ∈ (0, 1) r {1/2}, then there exists ab such that if a > ab then
fa,b has periodic orbits of all periods and is Li-Yorke chaotic.
This result has an interesting interpretation in the context of game theory and
learning in games. Parameter a can be treated as measuring the aggressiveness of a
player. Corollary 3.12 implies that if players have different cost functions (but they
do not differ too much, that is, α < 2β and β < 2α in (1)), their behavior will be
chaotic if only they are aggressive enough. Moreover, having in mind the connection
between this parameter and learning rate ε, see (4), we can interpret Corollary 3.12 as
stating that if players learn fast enough (ε is close to 1) then the system may become
chaotic.
4. Off the diagonal
The natural question which arises is whether the chaotic behavior emerges only
if both players share the same initial strategy, or chaos can happen also when their
initial strategy profiles are different. To answer this question, we study the family of
maps Fa,b : [0, 1]
2 → [0, 1]2 defined by (6), with a > 0 and b ∈ (0, 1).
The map Fa,b has five fixed points: (0, 0), (1, 1), (0, 1), (1, 0) and (b, b). Three
of them, namely (0, 1), (1, 0) and (b, b), are Nash equilibria of the congestion game.
That is, no agent can strictly decrease their cost by unilateral deviations to another
strategy.
Indeed, in the case of the (b, b) randomized strategy profile, the expected cost of
both agents (in the game defined by (1)) is equal to 3αβ/(α + β). Moreover, if the
first (second) agent were to deviate and choose a different strategy, his expected cost
would still remain unchanged. This means that (b, b) is a Nash equilibrium of the
game. By our assumption that 0 < b < 1 we derive that α < 2β and β < 2α. This
implies that (0, 0) and (1, 1) are not Nash equilibria, as each agent would strictly
prefer to choose distinct strategies than use the same strategy as the other agent.
Applying the same reasoning, states (0, 1) and (1, 0) are Nash equilibria, since in
these states deviating to another strategy leads to sharing the same strategy as your
opponent.
The derivative of Fa,b at (0, 1) and (1, 0) is
DFa,b(0, 1) =
(
exp(−a(1− b)) 0
0 exp(−ab)
)
,
DFa,b(1, 0) =
(
exp(−ab) 0
0 exp(−a(1− b))
)
,
so those points are attracting.
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To study the behavior of Fa,b close to the other three fixed points, and in general,
close to the diagonal, we compute the derivative of Fa,b on the diagonal:
(15) DFa,b(x, x) =
exp(a(x− b))(
x+ (1− x) exp(a(x− b))
)2
(
1 −ax(1 − x)
−ax(1 − x) 1
)
.
Thus, the eigenvectors of DFa,b at points (x, x) on the diagonal are
(
1
1
)
and
(
1
−1
)
.
The eigenvalue corresponding to the first one is of course the derivative of fa,b at
x, given by the formula (8). The eigenvalue corresponding to the second vector,
perpendicular to the diagonal, is
(16) λa,b(x) =
(1 + ax(1 − x)) exp(a(x− b))(
x+ (1− x) exp(a(x− b))
)2 .
We will show that in the long run the diagonal is exponentially repelling. That is,
the following theorem holds.
Theorem 4.1. For every a > 0 and b ∈ (0, 1) there exist a positive integer N and a
number κ > 1 such that for every x ∈ [0, 1] we have
(17)
N−1∏
k=0
λa,b(f
k
a,b(x)) ≥ κ.
Proof. We can rewrite (16) as
λa,b(x) = (1 + ax(1 − x)) exp(a(x− b))
(
fa,b(x)
x
)2
.
Take δ > 0 such that Ia,b ⊂ (δ, 1 − δ). If δ is sufficiently small, then the interval
(δ, 1 − δ) is invariant. Assume that x ∈ (δ, 1 − δ). Then 1 + ax(1 − x) > 1 + aδ2.
Therefore
λa,b(x) > (1 + aδ
2) exp(a(x− b))
(
fa,b(x)
x
)2
.
Taking the product over a piece of the trajectory of x, and using notation fka,b(x) = xk,
we get
n−1∏
k=0
λa,b(xk) > (1 + aδ
2)n exp
(
a
n−1∑
k=0
(xk − b)
)(
xn
x0
)2
.
Using (14), we get
(18)
n−1∏
k=0
λa,b(xk) > δ
4(1 + aδ2)n.
We have λa,b(0) = exp(ab) > 1 and λa,b(1) = exp(a(1− b)) > 1. Therefore, if δ > 0
is sufficiently small then λ(x) > 1+ aδ2 whenever x ≤ δ or x ≥ 1− δ. Clearly, in (18)
we can take arbitrarily small δ > 0, and the estimate holds whenever x ∈ (δ, 1 − δ).
This means that (18) holds for all x ∈ [0, 1].
Now we take N such large that δ4(1 + aδ2)N > 1 and set κ = δ4(1 + aδ2)N .
Then (17) holds. 
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Figure 2. Regions V , Tδ, Sr and Sℓ.
Corollary 4.2. There is a neighborhood U of the diagonal such that if (x, y) ∈ U
then the distance of FNa,b(x, y) from the diagonal is larger than the distance of (x, y)
from the diagonal.
Let us fix a > 0 and b ∈ (0, 1). For simplicity, we will now write F for Fa,b and
(xˆ, yˆ) for F (x, y) (if we apply F only once). If we iterate F , we will continue to write
(xn, yn) for F
n(x, y).
Let us establish some simple properties of F . We will consider the triangle below
the diagonal in the square [0, 1]2. Switching x and y will result in switching xˆ and yˆ,
so the corresponding results for the triangle above the diagonal will be the same.
Consider the rectangle
V = {(x, y) : 0 ≤ y < b < x ≤ 1}
(see Figure 2).
Lemma 4.3. If (x, y) ∈ V then its trajectory converges to (1, 0).
Proof. From the formula for F (equation (6)) it follows that if (x, y) ∈ V then xˆ > x
and yˆ < y. In particular, also (xˆ, yˆ) ∈ V . Therefore the sequence (xn) increases,
while the sequence (yn) decreases. The only possible limits for those sequences are 1
and 0 respectively. 
Elementary calculations result in the next property.
Lemma 4.4. The map F preserves the triangle below the diagonal. That is, if x > y
then xˆ > yˆ.
For small δ > 0 we set
Tδ = {(x, y) : b ≤ y < x ≤ 1− δ} ∪ {(x, y) : δ ≤ y < x ≤ b}
(see Figure 2).
Lemma 4.5. If δ > 0 is sufficiently small then F (Tδ) ⊂ Tδ ∪ V .
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Proof. Set
Sr = {(x, y) : b ≤ y ≤ x ≤ 1}, Sℓ = {(x, y) : 0 ≤ y ≤ x ≤ b}.
If (x, y) ∈ Sr then
xˆ =
x
x+ (1− x) exp(a(y − b))
≤
x
x+ (1− x)
= x.
Similarly, yˆ ≤ y. The set F (Sr) is a compact subset of the triangle {(x, y) : x ≥ y},
disjoint from the line y = 0 (because if yˆ = 0 then y = 0). Thus, there is δr > 0 such
that if (x, y) ∈ Sr then yˆ > δr. By similar arguments, there is δℓ > 0 such that if
(x, y) ∈ Sℓ then xˆ < 1− δℓ.
Take δ ∈ (0,min(δr, δℓ)) and (x, y) ∈ Tδ ∩ Sr. Then xˆ ≤ x ≤ 1 − δ. Since x > y,
by Lemma 4.4 we have xˆ > yˆ. Moreover, yˆ > δr > δ. Therefore, (xˆ, yˆ) ∈ Tδ ∪ V .
Similarly, if (x, y) ∈ Tδ ∩ Sℓ then (xˆ, yˆ) ∈ Tδ ∪ V . Since Tδ ⊂ Sr ∪ Sℓ, this completes
the proof. 
Similarly as in the one-dimensional case, we get by induction the formulas
xn =
x
x+ (1− x) exp
(
a
∑n−1
k=0(yk − b)
) ,
yn =
y
y + (1− y) exp
(
a
∑n−1
k=0(xk − b)
) .
Now we can prove the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 4.6. If 0 ≤ y < x ≤ 1 then the trajectory of (x, y) converges to (1, 0).
Proof. Suppose that 0 < y < x < 1, but the trajectory of (x, y) does not converge
to (1, 0). By Lemma 4.3, for all n we have (xn, yn) /∈ V . Choose δ > 0 such that
δ < y < x < 1 − δ and the inclusion from Lemma 4.5 holds with this δ. Then
(xn, yn) ∈ Tδ for all n. Therefore we have δ < yn < xn < 1− δ, so
δ <
y
y + (1− y) exp
(
a
∑n−1
k=0(xk − b)
) < x
x+ (1− x) exp
(
a
∑n−1
k=0(yk − b)
) < 1− δ.
In the same way as in the proof of Theorem 3.4, we get∣∣∣∣∣
n−1∑
k=0
(xk − b)
∣∣∣∣∣ < 2 log(1/δ)a and
∣∣∣∣∣
n−1∑
k=0
(yk − b)
∣∣∣∣∣ < 2 log(1/δ)a .
Therefore,
n−1∑
k=0
(xk − yk) <
4 log(1/δ)
a
.
Since xk > yk for all k, this means that the series
∞∑
k=0
(xk − yk)
converges, so limk→∞(xk − yk) = 0. However, this contradicts Corollary 4.2.
This proves that in the case 0 < y < x < 1 the sequence (xn, yn) converges to (1, 0).
If y = 0 then yn = 0 for all n, and the sequence (xn) increases. The limit of this
sequence is a number z > 0 such that (z, 0) is a fixed point of F , and the only such
point is (1, 0). Similarly, of x = 1 then (xn, yn) converges to (1, 0). 
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Taking into account what we observed about switching x and y, we can state a
more general corollary.
Corollary 4.7. If a point (x, y) ∈ [0, 1]2 is below (respectively, above) the diagonal,
its Fa,b-trajectory converges to (1, 0) (respectively, (0, 1)).
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